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THE FUTURE OF CLASSWIDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Catherine M. Sharkey*

Conventional wisdom holds that the punitive damages class action is susceptible
not only to doctrinalrestraintsimposed on class actions but also to constitutional
due process limitationsplaced on punitive damages. Thus, it would seem that the
prospects for punitive damages classes are even grimmer than for class actions
generally.
This conventional picture misunderstands the role of punitive damages and, in
particular,the relationship between class actions and punitive damages. It either
ignoresor underestimates the distinctly societal element of punitive damages, which
makes them especially conducive to aggregate treatment. Furthermore, punitive
damages classes offer a solution to the constitutional due process problem ofjuries
awarding "classwide" damages in a single-plaintiff case.
Courts' conceptualization of punitive damages as either individualistic or societal
dictates how they decide the certification question. My survey of recent case law
reveals that courts taking the plaintifffocused individualistic view of punitive
damages tend to deny class certification, while courts embracing the defendantfocused societal view are more likely to certify a punitive damages class, all else
being equal. Therefore, the viability of the punitive damages class depends upon the
persuasivenessof the societal conception of punitive damages.
Based on this empiricalgrounding I discuss two possibilitiesfor reform. First, state
legislatures and courts could affirmatively define the collectivized, societalrationale
for punitive damages. Such state legislative measures would likely withstand constitutional scrutiny under Philip Morris USA v. Williams, given the U.S.

Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the primacy of the state's role in defining the
legitimate purposes of punitive damages. Second, federal courts-in the absence of
definitive guidance from authoritative sources on state substantive law-could
consider the underlying societal rationalefor punitive damages in the course of
their certification decisions. To do so would not only be permitted, but indeed warranted, by the Rules Enabling Act.
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INTRODUCTION

In the realm of civil litigation, two features of "American exceptionalism" are under scathing attack: class actions and punitive
damages.' The product of their combination-the punitive damages class action-is susceptible not only to the doctrinal restraints
that have been imposed on class actions generally, but also to the
constitutional due process limitations that have been placed on punitive damages. Thus, it would seem that the prospects for punitive
damages classes are even grimmer than for class actions generally.
Such is the conventional wisdom in the academy and, increasingly,
2
in the courts.
However, this conventional picture misunderstands the role of
punitive damages and, in particular, the relationship between class
1.
For a sampling of articles portending the death of the class action, see, for example,
Myiam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class

Action, 104 MIcH L. REv. 373, 375 (2005) ("[C]lass actions will soon be virtually extinct.");
Symposium, Class Action Rollback? Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of Class Action Litigation, 62

DEPAUL L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (probing whether the death of class actions is nigh). For
some representative articles foretelling the demise of punitive damages, see, for example,
Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of PunitiveDamages' Iron Cage, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1297, 1302

(2005) ("The net effect of tort reforms has been to cabin and contain punitive damages by
marginalizing the role of the jury."); Symposium, Reforming Punitive Damages: The Punitive
Damages Debate, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 469 (2001) (calling into question the future of punitive
damages in the United States).
2.
As Professor Francis McGovern summed it up, "[bly most conventional wisdom,
there is little future for plaintiffs or defendants who desire to resolve punitive damages claims
globally using the procedural vehicle of a class action." Francis E. McGovern, Punitive Damages and Class Actions, 70 LA. L REv. 435, 435 (2010).
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actions and punitive damages. First, as a general matter, punitive
damages, unlike compensatory damages, have not only an individualistic element (focusing on the harms the plaintiff has suffered),
but also a societal element (focusing particularly on the holistic
harm caused by the defendant's conduct). This societal element of
punitive damages makes them more, not less, conducive to aggregate treatment.
Second, there is an underappreciated link between the popular
and judicial outcries over excessive punitive damages awards in individual cases and the specter of the class action. A decade ago, I
characterized an emergent trend of multimillion (or billion) dollar
punitive damages awards in single-plaintiff cases as the "poor man's
class action"; in these cases, juries appeared to justify these sizeable
awards based on widespread harms inflicted on people other than
the actual named plaintiff.3 If awarding "classwide" damages
(framed as punitive damages) in a single-plaintiff case is what rankles, then the punitive damages class solves, rather than aggravates,
the problem.
The Supreme Court has yet to address directly the viability of
punitive damages classes. 4 However, in a trio of constitutional excessive punitive damages cases culminating in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, the Court clamped down on the ability ofjuries to punish a
defendant on behalf of other harmed individuals who are not parties to the litigation.- In the wake of Williams, several notable
scholars have sounded the death knell for classwide punitive damages. 6 However, this over-reads Williams, which admittedly
3.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 350
(2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Societal Damages] ("State Farm represents an emerging paradigm
in punitive damages cases: a single or multiplaintiff case in which, in effect, 'classwide' punitive damages are assessed on a statewide or nationwide scale." (citing State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003))). See generally id. at 402-10.
4.
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive
Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 25, 49 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Exxon] ("The [Supreme]
Court has yet to address the link between punitive damages and class actions.").
5.
See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (prohibiting juries from
punishing for harm to nonparties); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
422-23 (2003) (prohibiting juries from awarding punitive damages for a defendant's dissimilar acts); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Core, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) (prohibiting juries from
considering a defendant's lawful out-of-state conduct in determining the defendant's reprehensibility for purposes of a punitive damages award).
6.
See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Agregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1105, 1138 (2010) ("By casting punitive damages ultimately as punishment vis-.A-vis the
plaintiff-not anyone else-the [Williams] Court arguably constitutionalizes a kind of divisible characterization for that remedy. On this view, punitive damages would be no more
amenable to class treatment than demands for the prototypical divisible remedy of compensatory damages."); Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court's Recent
Punitive DamagesDecisionsAffect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 884 (2008) ("Philip Morris
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emphasizes an individualistic notion of retributive punishment, to
squelch not only societal retributive conceptualizations of punitive
damages but also societal non-retributiverationales such as economic
deterrence, aimed at forcing the defendant to internalize the full
costs of its actions.
In this Article, I argue that the certification of punitive damages
classes hinges on courts' appreciation of the societal role or purpose of punitive damages. Part I puts forth my central claim that
courts' conceptualization of punitive damages as either individualistic or societal is dispositive on the certification question. First, I
stake out the normative claim that, apart from the more conventional individualistic and retributive purposes, punitive damages
may fulfill a non-retributive societal goal of economic deterrence or
loss internalization. Next, I provide some empirical backing: a survey of recent case law reveals that courts that take the plaintifffocused individualistic view tend to deny class certification, while
courts that embrace the defendant-focused societal view are more
likely to certify a punitive damages class, all else being equal. Support for this theory is also found in courts' attitudes towards
bifurcated trial management practices.
Part II is a rebuttal to the argument that Williams is a formidable
constitutional obstacle to the punitive damages class action. Notwithstanding academic demurrers to the contrary, I argue that the
societal conceptualization of punitive damages is not unconstitutional. Moreover, even if the "limited punishment" rationale for the
Rule 23(b) (1) (B) limited fund punitive damages class appears nigh
unworkable, 7 class certification is by no means foreclosed across the
board. Within the two remaining categories of punitive damages
illustrates the Court's rejection of deterrence theory . . . in the context of punitive damages.... [Wlhere harm to the class is individualized, punitive damages cannot be pursued as
a class-wide remedy."); Byron G. Stier, Now It's Personal: Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation
After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 433, 445-46 (2008) (concluding that
Williams renders punitive damages class actions functionally impracticable, if not formally
unconstitutional); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damage Class, 58 U. KAN.
L. REv. 845, 850 (2010) ("[P]revailing class action jurisprudence, integrated with the Court's
punitive damage jurisprudence, is unlikely to support certification of a Rule 23 (b)(3) punitive damage class. In addition, the Supreme Court is extremely unlikely to create an Ortiz
exception for punitive damage classes."). Professor Thomas Colby sounded an even earlier
(pre-Williams) pessimistic note. See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem:
Punitive Damages as Punishmentfor Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REv. 583, 664-65
(2003) ("[T]here are a number of significant impediments to the use of the class action
device to resolve punitive damages claims arising out of a single course of conduct. ...
[E]ven where the defendant's conduct was identical with respect to all victims (which is often
not the case), individual issues (including causation and the amount of both compensatory
and punitive damages) will tend to predominate, again making a class action unworkable.").
7.
See infra Part II.B.1.
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class actions-Rule 23(b) (2) equitable relief class actions and Rule
23(b) (3) money damages class actions-the conceptualization of
punitive damages as either individualistic or societal matters, and,
indeed, likely determines the outcome of the certification question.
I conclude with a fortified belief and prediction that the future
of the punitive damages class rests squarely on the viability of the
societal conception of punitive damages. Finally, I provide the
broad outlines of some reform possibilities to increase the likelihood that punitive damages classes will be certified.

I. SOCIETAL PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND CLASS CERTIFICATION

Whether courts conceptualize punitive damages as having an individualistic or societal purpose is key to how they decide the
certification question. Courts taking the plaintiff-focused individualistic view tend to deny class certification, while courts embracing
the defendant-focused societal view are more likely to certify a punitive damages class, all else being equal. The viability of the punitive
damages class, in other words, depends upon the persuasiveness of
the societal conception of punitive damages.

A. The Societal Purpose of Punitive Damages

Conceptually, punitive damages can be represented by the twoby-two matrix below, which disaggregates the purpose of punitive
damages along two axes: individualistic versus societal and retributive versus deterrent. The category of individualistic punitive
damages insists on the bipolar link between the particular defendant(s) and plaintiff(s) in the lawsuit; it relates the purpose of
punitive damages as either retributive punishment (Quadrant I) or
specific deterrence (Quadrant II) of the defendant only with respect to the harms inflicted upon the particular plaintiff(s) before
the court. The category of societal punitive damages-those directed toward effectuating a broader public purpose-is comprised
of retributive punishment on behalf of society (Quadrant III) or
non-retributive general deterrence (Quadrant IV).
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Figure 1. Punitive Damages Matrix
Retributive

Deterrent

Individualistic

I

II

Societal

III

IV

Punitive damages have been awarded in circumstances best characterized as punishment on behalf of the entire society (Quadrant
I1) for particularly egregious behavior with wide-ranging effects. 8
This supra-compensatory remedy has also been used in the name of
non-retributive general deterrence (Quadrant IV), to force an actor
to internalize the full costs of the harms that it has inflicted upon
groups-or classes-of individuals. 9
8.
See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[T]he punitive
award can be said to constitute a punishment on behalf of society.... ."), vacated, 407 F.3d
125, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[Plunitive damages, 'which have been described as quasi-criminal, operate as private fines intended to punish the defendant and to deter future
wrongdoing.'" (quoting Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)));
see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive
Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
979, 980-81 (2001) ("Punitive damages stand as a civil penalty for transgression of the social
compact .... to penalize conduct that violates the social contract and injures society.").
9.
There are several economic rationales for punitive damages. The primary economic
rationale for supra-compensatory damages-itself traceable back more than a century to Jeremy Bentham, but not formalized in the specific context of punitive damages until recent
decades-is optimal deterrence (or loss internalization): when compensatory damages alone
will not induce an actor to take cost-justified safety precautions, then supra-compensatory
damages are necessary to force the actor to internalize the full scope of the harms caused by
his actions.
Alternative economic rationales-disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and enforcement of
property rights-have been proposed to align the theory with the historical and conventional
focus of punitive damages on intentionally wrongful behavior. The Calabresi-Melamed
(1972) property rule/liability rule dichotomy provides one framework for choosing between
the loss internalization (liability-rule) and gain elimination/voluntary market transfer (property-rule) models. For further elaboration, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of
PunitiveDamages: Theoy, Empirics, and Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
TORTS (Jennifer Arlen, ed., Kluwer, forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1990336.
The basic economic model can be extended to the class action context:
At first blush, it may appear that any societal compensatory justification for punitive
damages largely dissolves in the context of a class action, at least assuming that all of
the relevant harmed individuals are before the court .... [But] [w]e might consider
whether a class of plaintiffs can itself serve as a proxy for society, or at least for a wider
societal group.
Sharkey, Societal Damages, supra note 3, at 410, 413. See also McGovern, supra note 2, at 462-63
("[A]nother possible role for a class action in punitive damages cases could materialize if a
court adopted a separate rationale for punitive damages based upon economic arguments
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B. Empirical Support of the Link Between Societal Punitive Damages
and Class Certification
Empirical support for the thesis advanced here-that the conceptualization of punitive damages as societal or individualistic will
dictate how a court decides certification questions-exists in the
context of courts' treatment of bifurcation questions as well as certification decisions. I address bifurcation and certification decisions
in turn.
1. Bifurcation Decisions
In bifurcated trial plans, punitive liability (and sometimes damages) is decided before individual compensatory damages;
bifurcation is often proposed in conjunction with punitive classes as
a superior trial management technique.
A pair of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
cases, which both were Rule 23(b) (2) class actions on behalf of a
group of female employees alleging employment discrimination,
provides an apt comparison.' 0 In both, the EEOC sought compensatory and punitive damages, and both parties agreed to bifurcation
of compensatory liability and damages." The EEOC argued further
that punitive liability and damages should be decided during the
first (compensatory liability) stage, while the defendants insisted
upon individual determinations of punitive liability and damages in
phase two. 1 2 But there the similarities end. In E.E.O.C. v. Outback

Steakhouse, the federal district court held that punitive liability
(though not amount of damages) could be decided in the first
stage; 13 the federal district court in E.E.O.C. v. SterlingJewelers Inc.
that damages for tortious conduct should be fully borne by the tortfeasor in order to achieve
optimal societal deterrence.").
10.
Compare E.E.O.C. v. Sterling Jewelers, 788 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84-85 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)
(class of roughly 20,000 former and current female employees), with E.E.O.C. v. Outback
Steakhouse, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203 (D. Colo. 2008) (class of female employees in a
three-state region). Note that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), may abrogate the class certification decisions in these cases, as they (like Dukes) involved Tide VII
employment discrimination claims and punitive damages. For discussion of Dukes, see infia
notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
See SterlingJewelers, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 85; Outback Steakhouse, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
11.
Compare SterlingJewelers, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 88, with Outback Steakhouse, 576 F. Supp.
12.
2d at 1206. Defendants raised the Court's constitutional due process punitive damages cases,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbel4 538 U.S. 408 (2003), and Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007), in support of their argument that punitive damages must be decided on an individual basis. See SterlingJewelers, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89. For
an analysis of this rationale, see infra Part II.A.
13.
576 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
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reached the opposite conclusion, holding that punitive liability
could not be assessed until the remedial phase (phase two).14
These differing outcomes are best explained by the two courts'
respective conceptualizations of the nature or purpose of punitive
damages. According to the Outback Steakhouse court, "'[t]he purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the victim, but to
punish and deter the defendant'"; the court elaborated that "the
focus of a punitive damages claim is 'not on the facts unique to
each class member, but on the defendant's conduct toward the
class as a whole.'- 15 This societal conceptualization of punitive damages trains its focus on the defendant's conduct that has caused
widespread harm.
In sharp contrast, the SterlingJewelers court embraced an individualistic notion of punitive damages and declined to resolve punitive
liability and damages on a classwide basis in the first phase of the
trial. 16 According to the court, "the highly individualized and subjective manner in which the discrimination is alleged to have
occurred" meant that damages awards likely would vary with respect
to each class member. 17 Therefore, any punitive damages decisions
would need to be "determined as part of the fact-specific individual
determinations made in Stage II."18 The court cited Williams (and

State Farm v. Campbell) in support of its individualistic conception of
punitive damages.' 9
The close factual similarity between these two EEOC cases supports my claim that the two courts' different conceptualizations of
the nature of punitive damages drove the disparate bifurcation decisions. Moreover, it is this same conceptual difference that
14.

788 F. Supp. 2d at 92.

15.
576 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 172
(N.D. Cal. 2004), affd en banc 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), revd 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)).
Given that Williams postdates Outback Steakhouse, one might question whether the court would
hold steadfast to this societal conceptualization of punitive damages in light of the Supreme
Court's embrace of the competing individualistic retributive conceptualization. However,
the Outback Steakhouse court reasoned that its decision was consistent with Campbell because
the amount of punitive damages, and therefore the relationship between compensatory and
punitive awards to individuals, would not be decided until the second stage of the litigation.
See id. at 1206-07. Given the federal district court's reasoning that the societal conception
withstood Campbell, it is not too far of a stretch to predict that it would likewise withstand
Williams.
16.
788 F. Supp. 2d at 92.
17.
Id. at 91.
18. Id. at 92.
19. Id. at 90 ("[T]he EEOC's proposed scheme of assessing punitive damages on a classwide basis before any determination is made as to the actual harm caused by that policy is
inconsistent with the principles articulated in State Farm and Philip Morris USA.").
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explains courts' attitudes towards certification of punitive damages
classes.

2. Certification Decisions
A survey of cases reveals that courts' conceptualization of punitive damages-classifying their underlying purpose as either
individualistic or societal-is dispositive on the certification
question.
In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,20 the Ninth Circuit embraced a distinctly societal conception of punitive damages. The court upheld
the certification of a Rule 23(b) (3) money damages class whereby
compensatory and punitive damages would be assessed using a statistical sample, without individualized hearings.2 1 The central
question the court posed in conducting its constitutional review of
the excessiveness of the punitive damages award was "'whether
there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as
well as the harm that actually has occurred.'"22 This is a societal
conception of punitive damages because the punitive award would
not be limited to the harms incurred by the particular plaintiffs
before the court.
Certification of equitable relief class actions under Rule 23(b) (2)
presents an interesting twist for punitive damages classes. In order
for punitive damages to be certified as part of an equitable relief
class action under Rule 23(b) (2), such damages would have to be
"incidental" to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.23 In WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court held that backpay could not be
characterized as incidental given the "individualized" nature of
24
such relief.
The Court's reasoning with respect to backpay could apply to punitive damages to the extent that such claims are considered
"individualized monetary claims. '25 Courts are divided on this question. In Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that
punitive damages could not be considered incidental to equitable
20.
103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
21.
See id. at 785-87.
22.
Id. at 780 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460
(1993)).
23.
E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
24.
See id.
25.
Id. at 2558. The Court states that individualized monetary claims can only be certified under Rule 23(b) (3), where additional procedural protections, including
predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and opt-out rights, apply. See id. at 2558-59.
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relief.2 6 In so holding, the Allison court hewed closely to the individualistic, plaintiff-oriented conceptualization of punitive damages:
"Punitive damages cannot be assessed merely upon a finding that
the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.
Such a finding establishes only that there has been general harm to
' 27
the group and that injunctive relief is appropriate."
Courts both within the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere have embraced this individual-oriented approach.2 8 For instance, an
Arkansas federal district court rejected classwide punitive damages
in a Rule 23(b) (2) class in Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 29 Plaintiffs,
who argued that Wal-Mart had discriminated against African-Americans in recruiting and hiring truck drivers, tried to persuade the
court that the focus of the punitive damages inquiry should be the
defendant's misconduct, 30 implicitly pushing a societal view of punitive damages. But the court demurred, insisting that "[fi]n most
cases, punitive damages are an individualized, and not a classwide,
remedy."3 1 Relying on Williams, 32 the court elaborated: "an award of
punitive damages often must include an inquiry into each plaintiff's
individual circumstances in order to determine the amount of punitive damages awardable to that plaintiff. 3' 3 The court thus held that
individualized determinations would be necessary "to determine
the extent of the harm caused by [the defendant's] conduct" given
that it was highly unlikely that each class member had suffered the
same harm from the defendant's allegedly racially discriminatory
26.
151 F.3d 402, 416-18 (5th Cir. 1998). The court reasoned that incidental damages
must "flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the
injunctive or declaratory relief," cannot depend "in any significant way on the intangible,
subjective differences of each class member's circumstances," and should not "require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual's case." Id. at 415.
27. Id. at 417.
28.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Loc. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 581 (7th
Cir. 2000) (applying Allison and reiterating that "to win punitive damages, an individual
plaintiff must establish that the defendant possessed a reckless indifference to the plaintiffs
federal rights-a fact-specific inquiry into that plaintiffs circumstances"); E.E.O.C. v. Int'l
Profit Assocs., Inc., No. 01 C 4427, 2007 WL 3120069, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 23, 2007)
(adopting Allison and Lemon's plaintiff-focused conceptualization of punitive damages and
requiring individualized inquiries into each class member's entitlement to punitive damages); Colindres v. Quietflex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 381 (S.D. Tex. 2006) ("As the court
clarified in Allison, the recovery of punitive damages in Title VII cases requires 'individualized
and independent proof of injury to, and the means by which discrimination was inflicted
upon, each class member.'" (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 420)).
29.
See 245 F.R.D. 358, 376-78 (E.D. Ark. 2007).
30.
See id. at 376. Plaintiffs emphasized the centrality of a common defendant strategy
given that the hiring practices had all been developed at corporate headquarters and initial
screening occurred through headquarters as well. See id.at 363-64.
31.
Id. at 376.
32.
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357 (2007).
33.
Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 376.
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practices.3 4 The Allison approach has become the prevailing position: punitive damages are individualistic and, as such, preclude
class certification.
But there are some notable exceptions. In Palmer v. Combined Insurance, an Illinois federal district court judge explained:
While I recognize that in most cases, an award of punitive
damages requires a fact-specific inquiry into an individual
plaintiff's circumstances . . . when the focus is on the defendant's conduct, as opposed to the class members' harms, and
the relief is sought for the class as a whole, I find that such
35
individualized proof is not necessarily required.
Note here the pivotal moment when the judge switches his focus
to the defendant's conduct and thereby adopts a societal conceptualization of punitive damages. Similarly, in E.E.0. C. v. Dial Corp., the
same Illinois federal court embraced classwide determination of punitive damages.3 6 Highlighting the deterrent function of punitive
damages, the court singled out "the defendant's conduct" as "the
most important indicium of the reasonableness of the punitive
damages award .... -7
Three years ago, I predicted that "[t]he ability to certify a punitive damages class going forward rests upon a distinctly societal
notion of punitive damages." 38 The lower courts' track record to
date vindicates my claim.

II.

OSTENSIBLE BARRIERS POSED BY PHILIP MORPRS V. WILLIAMS

To what extent has the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence impacted the punitive damages conceptual framework I
have put forward? More specifically, has Williams dealt a crippling
blow to the punitive damages class? According to prevailing wisdom, Williams dramatically alters the punitive damages landscape
(represented in the matrix in Part I.A. above) by prohibiting the
entire category of societal punitive damages, thereby wiping out
39
Quadrants III and IV.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 377.
217 F.R.D. 430, 438 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
See 259 F. Supp. 2d 710, 712 (N.D. Il. 2003).
Id. at 715 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).

38.
Sharkey, Exxon, supra note 4, at 50.
39.
That said, some commentators have argued that the rationale in Williams, far from
foreclosing the punitive damages class, calls out for it. See, e.g., ElizabethJ. Cabraser & Robert
J. Nelson, Class Action Treatment of Punitive Damages Issues After Philip Morris v. Williams: We
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By way of background, in a trio of cases-State Farm v. Campbell,
BMW v. Gore, and Philip Morris USA v. Williams-the Supreme Court
reined in excessive punitive damages while addressing the vexing
problem of "multiple punishment." 40 Each case involved a single
plaintiff who sought to punish a defendant for widespread harms
affecting myriad individuals, each of whom could later bring his
own action for punitive damages against the same defendant. The
defendant thus faced the prospect of being punished again and
again for the same misconduct. 4' The Williams Court's response was
to insist that the defendant could only be punished for the specific
harms suffered by the particular plaintiff in the case; the jury could
not punish the defendant for harms inflicted upon others, whom
the Court characterized as "strangers to the litigation." 42 Specifically, although the Williams Court said that evidence regarding a
defendant's widespread harms could be relevant to the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, judges had a responsibility to guard against the possibility that juries would punish the
defendant for harms inflicted on those other than the named
plaintiff.

43

Can Get Therefrom Here, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 407, 421 (2008) ("The obvious solution to the
'punishment for harm to plaintiffs only' dictate of Philip Morris is to bring more plaintiffs
before the court .... ."); James M. Underwood, Road to Nowhere orJurisprudentialU-Turn? The
Intersection of Punitive Damage Class Actions and the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
763, 802 (2009) (arguing that the punitive damages class action responds to Williams "[b]y
converting other victims of the tortfeasor's misconduct from 'strangers' into class
members").
40.
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 356 (2007) ("Philip Morris asked the
trial court to tell the jury . . . 'you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged
misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own .... "') (emphasis added); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) ("[Punishment for harm to
others] creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct; for
in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.");
Gore, 517 U.S. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Larger damages might also 'double count' by
including in the punitive damages award some of the compensatory, or punitive, damages
that subsequent plaintiffs would also recover.").
41.
See Williams, 549 U.S. at 350 ("Philip Morris pointed out that the plaintiffs attorney
had told the jury to 'think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the
State of Oregon there have been.'"); Campbell 538 U.S. at 420 ("From their opening statements onward the Campbells framed this case as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its
nationwide activities."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994) ("It
seems apparent from the record that the jury's punitive damages award is based upon a
multiplication of $4,000 (the diminution in value of the Gore vehicle) times 1,000 (approximately the number of refinished vehicles sold in the United States)."), rev'd, 517 U.S. 559
(1996).
42. 549 U.S. at 353.
43.
Id. at 355 ("Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so
was particularly reprehensible ....
Yet . . . a jury may not go further than this and use a
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A. The Persistence of Societal Punitive Damages
In the wake of Williams, the late Professor Richard Nagareda led
the charge against the societal conception of punitive damages:
The constitutional message in Williams-that punitive damages are ultimately about punishment for the wrong done to
the plaintiff at hand-gives a considerable nod to what [is]
described as plaintiff-focused views in torts literature ....

By

casting punitive damages ultimately as punishment vis-A-vis the
plaintiff-not anyone else-the [ Williams] Court arguably constitutionalizes a kind of divisible characterization for that
remedy.But this conventional interpretation over-reads Williams, which is
more accurately read to foreclose punitive damages as societal punishment (Quadrant III) while remaining silent as to punitive
damages as a vehicle for non-retributive societal deterrence (Quadrant IV). It cannot be gainsaid that the Williams Court implicitly
adopted the individualistic retributive conception of punitive damages (Quadrant I). It seems equally clear that the Court foreclosed
adopting a societal retributive conception of punitive damages as
punishment on behalf of society or a wider group that extends beyond the individual named plaintiff (Quadrant III).45

That said, the Court left untouched the non-retributive deterrence conception of punitive damages (Quadrants II and IV). The
Court did not "constitutionalize" the individual retributive punishment conception of punitive damages (Quadrant I).46 To the
punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to
have visited on nonparties.").
44.
Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1136. See also Paul B. Rietema, Reconceptualizing Split-Recovery Statutes: Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007), 31 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 1159,
1166 (2008) (suggesting Williams signals the demise of societal punitive damages). Sheila
Scheuerman similarly reads Williams to foreclose the societal view of punitive damages. See
Scheuerman, supra note 6, at 932 ("[T]he Supreme Court has premised its [punitive damages] due process theory on a one-on-one model of adjudication that focuses on the parties'
relationship to one another and not the impact on non-parties or larger social issues.").
45.
The Court signaled its rejection of societal retribution as the basis for punitive damages in its earlier decision in Campbell "A defendant should be punished for the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff,not for being an unsavory individual or business." 538 U.S. at 423 (emphasis added).
46.
See Thomas B. Colby, Clearingthe Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 477 (2008). But see Michael P. Allen, Of
Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 343, 352 (2008) "[I]n reading the Court's decisions, it
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contrary, the Court echoed its oft-repeated federalism-infused pronouncement that a court's constitutional review of the
excessiveness of punitive damages should look first to "a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition." 47 Thus, to withstand Williams's constitutional scrutiny,
plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that punitive damages' non-re48
tributive deterrence purpose is a legitimate state interest.

B. Repercussionsfor CertificationDecisions
Class actions are under attack. Even apart from Williams, the Supreme Court in recent years has significantly curtailed prospects for
certifying Rule 23(b) (1) (B) limited fund classes or Rule 23(b) (2)
equitable relief classes. The question, then, is whether and to what
extent Williams solidifies or tightens the Court's restrictions in the
realm of punitive damages class actions.
Several scholars have characterized Williams as the "nail in the
coffin" for the punitive damages class action. 49 But this view stems
from an erroneous over-reading of Williams (as argued above). Instead, to the extent that punitive damages embody a societal
deterrence objective, a punitive damages class should be more-not
less-prone to certification than any compensatory damages class,
which is more apt to hinge on individualistic differences among
plaintiffs.
That said, Williams does strengthen the already solid case against
certification of a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) limited fund punitive damages
class action, at least to the extent that the latter rests on a societal
retributive rationale, which is no longer tenable in the wake of Williams. However, foreboding claims of the deaths of Rule 23(b) (2)
and Rule 23(b) (3) punitive damages classes-so long as parties and
courts resist characterization of punitive damages as an exclusively
individualistic remedy-are premature.
seems far more likely that the Court was going beyond the descriptive; it was itself establishing the constitutionally legitimate purposes of th [e] historically state-defined remedial device
[of punitive damages].") (emphasis added); supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47.
Williams, 549 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)); accord Campbel4 538 U.S. at 416; Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMErrE L. REv. 449, 470 (2010)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Federal Incursions] ("[Elven as the U.S. Supreme Court intervenes to
scrutinize punitive damages awarded under state law, it always begins with an opening salvo
of deference to the 'state interests' served by punitive damages. Nothing in Williams changes
this key federalism point .

48.
49.

").

See supra note 9.
See sources cited supra note 6.
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1. Rule 23(b) (1) (B) Limited Fund Class Actions
The conventional take on Williams is that, in combination with
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,50 an earlier class action decision, it dealt a
fatal blow to the punitive damages class action. In Ortiz, the Supreme Court "clamp[ed] down significantly on adventuresome
applications of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) [limited fund class actions], and
signal[ed] strong bias against class certification and in favor of individual litigation in future mass torts."51 Although the Supreme
Court in Ortiz did not definitively close the door to Rule
23 (b) (1) (B) punitive damages classes, the Court strongly suggested
that it would not construe Rule 23(b) (1) (B) as capacious enough
52
to embrace the limited fund punitive damages class action.
Prior to Ortiz, before the Alaska federal district court, defendant
Exxon requested and was granted certification of a mandatory nonopt-out punitive damages class of more than thirty-two thousand
plaintiffs-commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners-in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. 3 This Rule 23(b) (1) (B) "limited
fund" class was premised on a "limited punishment" theory:
namely, that constitutional due process imposes an upper limit on
the total aggregate amount of punitive damages that a defendant
50.
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
51.
Sharkey, Exxon, supra note 4, at 49-50. See generally Mullenix, supra note 6, at 872
("[T]he [Ortiz] Court set forth three criteria for certification of a limited-fund class, requiring proof of: (1) the existence of an actual limited or insufficient fund, (2) use of the entire
inadequate fund to pay all the claims in the class action, and (3) equitable treatment of all
class claimants.").
See generally Richard A. Nagareda, PunitiveDamage Class Actions and the Baseline of Tort,
52.
36 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 943, 957 (2001) ("The limited fund concept that animates Rule
23(b) (1) (B) and the demand in Ortiz for proof of that limit make sense only for funds that
truly would be limited in the context of actual litigation, absent the existence of the class
action."). For further exploration of the debate among commentators regarding the benefits
of the limited fund punitive damages class, compare, for example, Aileen L. Nagy, Note,
Certifying Mandatory Punitive Damages Classes in a Post-Ortiz and State Farm World, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 599, 625-28 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court should make an exception to Ortiz
to certify Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) punitive damages classes because such an exception would benefit: plaintiffs, who no longer would have to engage in a race to the courthouse in order to
stake out a punitive damages claim before the due process limit on punitive damages had
been reached; defendants, who would achieve final resolution or global peace; and the judicial system, which would achieve an efficient and comprehensive resolution), with, for
example, Richard Frankel, The Disappearing Opt-Out Right in Punitive-Damages Class Actions,
2011 Wis. L. REV. 563, 590 ("[L]imited-punishment classes provide plaintiffs with no additional benefit in exchange for sacrificing their right to opt out and bring their own litigation.
Instead, the real winners are (a) defendants-who can settle a class action on the cheap and
pay plaintiffs an artificially low level of punitive damages, and (b) class counsel-who can
maximize their attorneys' fees by preventing individual class members from pursuing their
claims outside of the class action.").
554 U.S. 471, 479 (2008). For a more detailed account, see generally Sharkey, Ex53.
xon, supra note 4, at 46-51.
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could face for a single act or course of conduct. 54 In the wake of

Exxon Shipping, Professor Francis McGovern optimistically proclaimed that the decision "provides at least one scenario in which
there can be a punitive damages class action ....

Looking to the

future, there may be circumstances similar to Exxon that will
55
occur."
Nonetheless, the prospects for limited fund punitive damages
classes are limited. As even the federal district court in Exxon Shipping conceded, the "singular nature of the spill" created a "unique
and compelling" case for the certification of a mandatory non-optout punitive damages class.5 6 Nor does the Supreme Court's failure
to disturb the mandatory Rule 23(b) (1) (B) punitive damages class
in Exxon Shippingprovide much of a glimmer of hope given that the
issue of the punitive damages class certification was not before the
Court.
Finally, to the extent that the limited fund punitive damages class
action rests on a "limited punishment" rationale, Williams presents a
formidable additional obstacle. As explained above, although the
Williams Court did not constitutionalize an exclusively individualistic conception of punitive damages, it did foreclose a societal
retributive conception of punitive damages (Quadrant III). The
54. The federal district court accepted Exxon's argument that "due process places a
limit on punitive damages and, in substance, creates a limited fund from which punitive
damages may be awarded." In re Exxon Valdez, No. A-89-095-CV (D. Alaska, March 8, 1994),
Order No. 180 Supplement at 9 (quoted in Sharkey, Exxon, supra note 4, at 47-48 & n.l0).
Subsequently, the plaintiffs in In re Simon II Litigation invoked the "limited punishment"
theory against the vociferous objection of the tobacco defendants. JudgeJack Weinstein certified a mandatory non-opt-out punitive damages-only class on this theory, 211 F.R.D. 86,
110-11 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), but his decision was overturned by the Second Circuit, which held
that a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) limited fund based on the limited punishment theory was "not easily
susceptible to proof, definition, or even estimation, by any precise figure." In re Simon II
Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2005).
Certification of a mandatory non-opt-out punitive damages class based on the limited
punishment theory was successfully invoked (though subsequently voluntarily abandoned by
plaintiffs in the interest ofjudicial efficiency) in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. O'Del4 No.
00-C-37, 2006 WL 6367367,
53-65 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 2, 2006), in which the court
warned: "Absent such certification, a scenario could arise where late-filing class members are
unable to collect punitive damages because the available pool of punitive damages, as limited
by due process concerns espoused by Campbell, has been drained by earlier-filing class members." Id. 63.
55.
McGovern, supra note 2, at 445. McGovern provides a list of relevant factors leading
to the certification of the mandatory non-opt-out punitive damages class in Exxon Shipping,
including that there was a single tortious event, the goal of certification was to prevent
overdeterrence, the defendant moved for certification, and the class was mandatory. Id.
56. Sharkey, Exxon, supra note 4, at 48 (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, No. A-89-095-CV
(D. Alaska, Mar. 8, 1994), Order No. 180 Supplement at 10 ("The reasons for certifying a
punitive damages class under a 'limited punishment' theory are, perhaps, more unique and
compelling in this case than in any other. Unlike the majority of mass tort class actions, this
case involves an unusual convergence of identity of occurrence, law, and fact.")).
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"limited punishment" rationale for the limited fund punitive damages class-which rests on the premise that there is an outer limit
on the amount of punishment on behalf of society or a wider group
that extends beyond the individual plaintiff in a case-is thus not
viable.

2. Rule 23(b) (2) Equitable Relief Class Actions
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 7 presents a more recent hurdle to
certification of class actions. 58 Of particular relevance to this Article,

the Dukes Court narrowed the possibility for certification of classes
bringing individualized monetary claims under Rule 23(b) (2). The
Court held that individualized relief, such as claims for backpay,
could not be combined with classwide relief under Rule 23(b) (2);
instead, such claims should be brought under Rule 23(b) (3).

59

Did the Court thereby curtail the prospects for certification of
punitive damages classes under Rule 23(b)(2)? If one reads Williams to foreclose all societal conceptions of punitive damagesbased on either retributive punishment (Quadrant III) or general
deterrence (Quadrant 1V)-then, taken together with Dukes, the
Court has seemingly dealt a one-two punch to the certifiability of
the punitive damages class. The argument proceeds as follows: punitive damages, like backpay, cannot be certified in mandatory
classes because they raise individualized issues.
57.
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
58.
Dukes mandates that to demonstrate "proof of commonality" (a required showing for
class certification), plaintiffs must show that class certification "will produce a common answer" to the common question. Id. at 2552. Dukes changed the commonality standard's focus
from whether there are judicial efficiencies to be found in questions common to the class, to
whether the common claims can be resolved en masse:
What matters to class certification.., is not the raising of common 'questions'-even
in droves-but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed
class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.
Id. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof 84
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 97, 132 (2009)).
Although it is still unclear whether Dukes is binding outside of the Titde VII or mandatory
class action contexts, its holding has the potential to jeopardize the certification of many class
actions. According to Professor Robert Klonoff, "The full reach of Dukes remains to be seen,
-and not surprisingly, the results are mixed.... [Elarly indications suggest a greater impact in
(b) (2) cases than in (b) (3) cases." Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.
L. Ra. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 53-54), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2038985.
59.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.

University of MichiganJournalofLaw Reform

1144

[VOL. 46:4

But this argument rests on the misguided over-reading of Williams discussed above. It wrongly presumes that Williams precludes
the societal deterrent conception of punitive damages (Quadrant
IV). Quadrant IV does not hinge on individualized issues and, thus,
leaves open an avenue for certification of punitive damages as incidental to equitable relief. Even in the wake of Dukes and Williams,
courts can find a way to embrace the societal deterrent conceptualization of punitive damages and to certify a Rule 23(b) (2) punitive
damages class.
My view finds support in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,60 in which
the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration a Rule 23(b) (2)
punitive damages class certification in light of Dukes.6' In so doing,
the court reaffirmed its embrace of the societal conceptualization
of punitive damages: "[Punitive damages] claims focus on the conduct of the defendant and not the individual characteristics of the
plaintiffs."62 For that reason, the court suggested that certification
of a Rule 23(b) (2) punitive damages class might still be viable postDukes.

63

On remand, the federal district court agreed. According to the
court, "given the nature of Plaintiffs' claims alleging a pattern or
practice of discrimination, the punitive damages inquiry necessarily
focuses on Defendant's conduct with respect to the class as a whole,
rather than any individual employment decisions with respect to
64
specific employees."
Ellis strongly suggests that so long as the societal understanding
of punitive damages persists, certification of Rule 23(b) (2) punitive
damages classes remains possible. Conversely, courts that characterize punitive damages as individualized monetary relief will likely

60.
657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
61.
The court held that the district court failed to engage in the "rigorous analysis" that
Dukes requires in order to find the commonality requirement satisfied. Id. at 984.
62.
Id. at 987 (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 643 (N.D. Cal.
2007) affd in part, vacated in part, 657 F.3d 970).
63.
See id ("The [district] court may consider whether punitive damages are an allowable form[ ] of incidental monetary relief consistent with the Court's interpretation of
23(b) (2) because they do not require an individual determination.").
64.
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 543 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The court
held that "while the availability of punitive damages should be adjudicated in Stage One of
the trial, determination of the aggregate amount and individual distribution of punitive damages should be reserved for Stage Two." Id. at 542. As the court explained, "[siuch an
arrangement will take advantage of the bifurcated trial procedure while safeguarding Defendant's right to ensure that any punitive damages award remains tethered to the
compensatory damages actually awarded in Stage Two, consistent with State Farm" Id. at 543.
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deny certification. 65 Thus, in the face of Williams, my central thesis
remains valid.

3. Rule 23(b) (3) Money Damages Classes
The Ninth Circuit's ringing endorsement of the Rule 23(b) (3)
punitive damages class in Hilao66 pre-dated the Supreme Court's
trio of constitutional cases reining in punitive damages awards.
Moreover, Hilao is the only Rule 23(b) (3) punitive damages class
action that has survived all the way from certification to a trial verdict. 67 So, here too, it is fair to ask whether Williams poses a barrier

to certification of Rule 23(b) (3) punitive damages classes.
I argue that it does not. My position finds support in Iorio v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America.68 There, a California federal
district court certified a Rule 23(b) (3) punitive damages class action brought by a group of senior citizens seeking to recover for
harms stemming from the defendant's allegedly fraudulent scheme
that tricked them into purchasing deferred annuities. 69 The defendant relied on Williams in moving to decertify the class. 70 The court
rejected the challenge, reasoning that punitive damages would be
awarded based on the defendant's misconduct (thereby considering harms to others) and, accordingly, individual hearings to
determine punitive damages were not necessary. 71 Moreover, the
court held that an appropriate punitive-compensatory ratio could
be set based on the compensatory damages awarded to subclasses
and on the overall actual or potential harm caused by the defendant's misconduct. The court also noted that it could adjust
65.
See, e.g., Mothersell v. City of Syracuse, 5:08-CV-615 NAM/TWD, 2013 WL 936454, at
*12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013) ("Because the amended complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, the instant action cannot proceed
as a Rule 23(b) (2) class action. As the Supreme Court made clear in Wal-Mart, 'individualized
monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)."'); Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No.
3:08CV540, 2012 WL 113657, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2012) ("[P]laintiffs cannot state class
claims for individualizedmonetary relief, such as back pay, punitive damages, and liquidated
damages ... because the Supreme Court unanimously held in Dukes that such relief is not
available under Rule 23(b)(2).") (emphasis added).
66.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
67. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 860 ("Hilao, then, remains the sole example of a 23(b) (3)
class action for compensatory and punitive damages that was certified, actually tried, and
resulted in quantifiable damages to the class claimants.").
68.
See No. 05 CV 633 JLS (CAB), 2009 WL 3415703 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009).
69.
Id. at *1.
70. Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
71.
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classwide punitive damages to comply with constitutional limits, as
72
the Supreme Court had done in Exxon Shipping.
In keeping with my central thesis, it remains the case post-Williams that a court's recognition of a societal conception of punitive
damages can anchor certification of Rule 23(b) (2) and (b) (3) punitive damages classes.

C. "Strangers to the Litigation"

I address one final ostensible obstacle that Williams poses to the
punitive damages class. In her takedown of the punitive damages
class action, Professor Linda Mullenix argues that, because absent
class members are not technically 'joined" in a class action, but
rather are merely "represented," they are strangers to the litigation
and therefore "properly characterized as nonparties." 73 On Mullenix's account, any punitive damages award based on harm to
absent class members violates Williams's directive against punishing
the defendant for harm to nonparties.74 Mullenix's argument goes
too far; her reasoning, taken to its logical conclusion, would undermine the constitutionality not only of punitive damages classes, but
75
of all class actions.

Albeit unnamed, absent class members are not "strangers to the
litigation." An award of punitive damages to a class is based on
harm to the class (each member of which is a party or has some
aspects akin to formal parties) as opposed to harm to nonparties.For
certain significant purposes, absent class members are treated as
parties. They possess (admittedly limited) rights to participate in
the class action-for example, by objecting-or exit, and they do
not need to intervene formally as parties in order to appeal decisions on the basis of objections actually raised before the trial
court. 76 It would not be anomalous, therefore, for absent class
72.
Id. at *7. After certification of the class in Iorio, the case settled. Notice of Motion &
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement & Related Orders at 1,
lorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 05 CV 633JLS (CAB), 2009 WL 3415703 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 21, 2009).
73.
Mullenix, supra note 6, at 879, 882.
74,
See id. at 882.
75.
See Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 27 REV.
LITIG. 9, 29 (2007) ("The only real plaintiffs are the class representatives. If the Due Process
Clause does not permit a court to impose a damage award or penalty on behalf of 'persons
who are not before the court,' then it would appear to invalidate class action lawsuits.")
(footnote omitted).
76.
See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 1, 6-14 (2002).
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members to be treated as parties for the purpose of Williams's due
process analysis.
Even were absent class members considered nonparties, that
would not mean that they are "strangers to the litigation." There is
a significant difference between the special treatment of absent
class members and the treatment of true nonparties-or strangers.
Williams itself is an example: other Oregonian smokers seeking punitive damages would in no sense be precluded from seeking their
own punitive awards following Williams's favorable verdict on punitive damages, but they most certainly would have been precluded
had they been included as absent class members in the Williams litigation. Absent class members' punitive claims are therefore before
the court because their rights are being adjudicated at the same
time as the rights of the named representatives.
The case law, moreover, explicitly rejects arguments that unnamed class members are legal strangers. In Iorio, the federal
district court rebuffed the defendant's argument that Williams prohibits awarding punitive damages on a representative basis because
77
unnamed class members are legal strangers from one another.
The court explained:
In the present case ...

the non-representative class members

who received notice and did not opt out are parties to the litigation. Even though they may be absent from trial, any
punitive damages will be awarded based on the harm done to
those members, not to strangers or those whose interests are
not before the court. This is illustrated by the requirement
that class counsel is bound to represent all class members' in78
terests, not just those of the representatives.
A West Virginia state court rejected a similar argument that Williams foreclosed the award of punitive damages to unnamed class
members. 79 As in Iorio, the court held that unnamed class members
were parties to the litigation, unlike the "nonparties" or "strangers
to the litigation" whose harm the punitive damages award in Williams redressed.8 0
Thus, Williams does not close the door on certification of punitive damages classes.
77.
See No. 05 CV 633 JLS (CAB), 2009 WL 3415703, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009).
78.
Id.
79.
Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, No. 03-C-10E, 2007 WL 5539870, slip op. at
93a, 120a (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2007).
80.
Id. at 94a-95a.
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CONCLUSION: REFORM POSSIBILITIES

Given the formidable barriers to class certification in general, the
portrait depicted above does not, by any stretch of the imagination,
present an optimistic future for the punitive damages class. It does,
however, shed light on a hitherto underexplored aspect of punitive
damages certification, finding that, all else being equal, courts are
more likely to certify punitive damages class actions when they
adopt a societal, as opposed to individualistic, conception of punitive damages.
I have called into question the simple conclusion that Williams,
standing alone, sounds the death knell for punitive damages classes. To be sure, Williams foreclosed certification of Rule
23(b) (1) (B) limited fund punitive damages classes based upon a
societal retributive theory of punitive damages (i.e., Quadrant III).
However, Williams does not meaningfully obstruct certification of
punitive damages classes-either equitable relief class actions
under Rule 23(b) (2) or money damages class actions under Rule
23(b) (3)-based on a societal, deterrent conceptualization of punitive damages (i.e., Quadrant IV).
My central claim is that, to the extent that any prospects exist for
punitive damages classes under either Rule 23(b) (2) or Rule
23(b) (3), the fate of these classes' certifications rises or falls on
whether courts conceptualize punitive damages as societal or
individualistic.
If my understanding holds, there are several reform possibilities
to increase the likelihood that punitive damages classes will be certified. State legislatures could affirmatively defend punitive damages
8
based on under-enforcement and under-deterrence rationales. '
For example, states could enact a statutory multiplier for certain
torts based on the likelihood of under-detection-the grounds for
which would, ideally, be expressly stated in a statute's text or preamble, or at least in reported legislative history. Such state legislative
measures, moreover, would likely withstand constitutional scrutiny
under Williams, given that the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirms the
primacy of a state's role in defining the legitimate purposes of puni8 2

tive damages.
81.

See supra note 9.

82.
See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007). See also Sharkey, Federal
Incursions, supra note 47, at 478 ("To date, states have not pressed non-retributive punish-

ment rationales for punitive damages. But if a state were to articulate a societal compensatory
or deterrence purpose in enacting a statutory multiplier for certain torts, or a split-recovery
scheme (or a combination of both), the Court would be hard-pressed to strike down these
legislative enactments as unconstitutional.").
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Alternatively (and somewhat more radically), given courts' ad
hoc consideration of the individualistic versus societal conception
of punitive damages in light of the particulars of the case before
them, the courts' analysis of this dimension might become more
predictable and reliable if it were built into the conceptual framework for Rule 23 certification decisions when a punitive damages
class is at issue. Courts, relying on their interpretations of the underlying state law policies undergirding punitive damages, could
develop interstitial common law standards, identifying factual situations where under-detection, under-enforcement, or societal
deterrence prerogatives predominate.
Would the Rules Enabling Act (the statute that authorizes the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and mandates that procedural
8 3
rules "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right" )

stand in the way of such reform possibilities? Two prominent procedural scholars, Professors Stephen Burbank and Tobias Wolff, have
argued persuasively that, properly understood, the Rules Enabling
Act not only permits-but actually requires-consideration of the
relationship between procedural tools and the underlying liability
policies that they seek to carry into effect. In particular, they argue:
[C] ourts must look to the substantive liability and regulatory
regimes of state and federal law in determining whether aggregate relief is appropriate and consistent with the goals of that
underlying law. Rule 23 is merely the mechanism for carrying
an aggregate proceeding into effect when the underlying law
84
supports that result.

Their view echoes that of Professor David Rosenberg, who likewise urges federal courts (and the U.S. Supreme Court in

83.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
84.
Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunitiesof
Shady Grove, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 17, 21 (2010). Moreover, to the extent that state legislatures and courts have not had occasion to offer guidance concerning the impact and
desirability of an aggregate remedy on liability and regulatory goals, Burbank and Wolff urge
that "a federal court must necessarily rely upon its best judgment-informed by a combination of existing statements of state liability policy and general principles of class
adjudication-as to the direction in which state authorities would move the law." Id. at 67. See
also Tobias Barrington Wolff, ManagerialJudging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 35-36) ("When judges must determine whether to constrain or authorize expansive and unprecedented forms of litigation in class or mass tort
adjudication, they can use the goals of the underlying substantive law in the disputes before
them as guideposts for their decisions.").
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particular) to appreciate that state tort law causes of action may
85
have collectivized (in addition to individualized) functions.
The thrust of these scholars' arguments supports the two proposed tracks of reforms. First, state legislatures and courts could
affirmatively define the collectivized, societal rationale for punitive
damages. Second, federal courts-in the absence of definitive guidance from authoritative sources on state substantive law-could
consider the underlying societal rationale for punitive damages in
the course of their certification decisions. To do so would not only
be permitted, but indeed warranted, by the Rules Enabling Act.

85.
See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort
Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REv. 1871, 1874 n.10 (2002) ("[D]eterrence and insurance have been the express justifications for products liability generally and liability for
The Amchem Court's analytic defaults must therefore inasbestos exposure specifically ....
clude its unexamined, not to mention unsubstantiated, assumption that state "substantive"
tort law (as enforced under the Rules Enabling Act) commands federal trial courts to individualize liability and compensation regardless of the deterrence- and insurance-defeating
consequences.").

